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ABSTRACT 
This article presents a comprehensive framework for valuing financial instruments subject to 
credit risk and collateralization. In particular, we focus on the impact of default dependence on asset 
pricing, as correlated default risk is one of the most pervasive threats to financial markets. Some well-
known risky valuation models in the markets can be viewed as special cases of this framework. We 
introduce the concept of comvariance (or comrelation) into the area of credit risk modeling to capture the 
default relationship among three or more parties. Accounting for default correlations and comrelations 
becomes important, especially during the credit crisis. Moreover, we find that collateralization works well 
for financial instruments subject to bilateral credit risk, but fails for ones subject to multilateral credit risk. 
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1 Introduction 
A broad range of financial instruments bear credit risk. Credit risk may be unilateral, bilateral, or 
multilateral. Some instruments such as, loans, bonds, etc, by nature contain only unilateral credit risk 
because only the default risk of one party appears to be relevant, whereas some other instruments, such as, 
over the counter (OTC) derivatives, securities financing transactions (SFT), and credit derivatives, bear 
bilateral or multilateral credit risk because two or more parties are susceptible to default risk. This paper 
mainly discusses bilateral and multilateral credit risk modeling, with a particular focus on default 
dependency, as correlated credit risk is one of the greatest threats to global financial markets. 
There are two primary types of models that attempt to describe default processes in the literature: 
structural models and reduced-form (or intensity) models. Many practitioners in the credit trading arena 
have tended to gravitate toward the reduced-from models given their mathematical tractability. They can 
be made consistent with the risk-neutral probabilities of default backed out from corporate bond prices or 
credit default swap (CDS) spreads/premia.  
Central to the reduced-form models is the assumption that multiple defaults are independent 
conditional on the state of the economy. In reality, however, the default of one party might affect the 
default probabilities of other parties. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) and Zhang and Jorion (2007) find that 
a major credit event at one firm is associated with significant increases in the credit spreads of other 
firms. Giesecke (2004), Das et al. (2006), and Lando and Nielsen (2010) find that a defaulting firm can 
weaken the firms in its network of business links. These findings have important implications for the 
management of credit risk portfolios, where default relationships need to be explicitly modeled. 
The main drawback of the conditionally independent assumption or the reduced-form models is 
that the range of default correlations that can be achieved is typically too low when compared with 
empirical default correlations (see Das et al. (2007)). The responses to correct this weakness can be 
generally classified into two categories: endogenous default relationship approaches and exogenous 
default relationship approaches.  
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The endogenous approaches include the contagion (or infectious) models and frailty models. The 
frailty models (see Duffie et al. (2009), Koopman et al. (2011), etc) describe default clustering based on 
some unobservable explanatory variables. In variations of contagion or infectious type models (see Davis 
and Lo (2001), Jarrow and Yu (2001), etc.), the assumption of conditional independence is relaxed and 
default intensities are made to depend on default events of other entities. Contagion and frailty models fill 
an important gap but at the cost of analytic tractability. They can be especially difficult to implement for 
large portfolios. 
The exogenous approaches (see Li (2000), Laurent and Gregory (2005), Hull and White (2004), 
Brigo et al. (2011), etc) attempt to link marginal default probability distributions to the joint default 
probability distribution through some external functions. Due to their simplicity in use, the exogenous 
approaches become very popular in practice. 
Collateralization is one of the most important and widespread credit risk mitigation techniques 
used in derivatives transactions. According the ISDA (2012), 71% of all OTC derivatives transactions are 
subject to collateral agreements. The use of collateral in the financial markets has increased sharply over 
the past decade, yet the research on collateralized valuation is relatively sparse. Previous studies seem to 
turn away from direct and detailed modeling of collateralization (see Fuijii and Takahahsi (2012)). For 
example, Johannes and Sundaresan (2007), and Fuijii and Takahahsi (2012) characterize collateralization 
via a cost-of-collateral instantaneous rate (or stochastic dividend or convenience yield). Piterbarg (2010) 
regards collateral as a regular asset in a portfolio and uses the replication approach to price collateralized 
contracts. 
This paper presents a new framework for valuing defaultable financial instruments with or 
without collateral arrangements. The framework characterizes default dependencies exogenously, and 
models collateral processes directly based on the fundamental principals of collateral agreements. Some 
well-known risky valuation models in the markets, e.g., the CDS model, the risky interest rate swap (IRS) 
model (Duffie and Huang (1996)), can be viewed as special cases of this framework, when the default 
dependencies are ignored.  
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IRSs and CDSs are two of the largest segments of the OTC derivatives market, collectively 
accounting for around two-thirds of both the notional amount and market value of all outstanding 
derivatives. Given this framework, we are able to analyze the value of IRSs with bilateral credit risk and 
look at how swap rates are affected by correlated default risk. Our study shows that counterparty default 
correlations have a relatively small impact on swap rates. Furthermore, we find that the value of a fully 
collateralized IRS is equal to the risk-free value. This conclusion is consistent with the current market 
practice in which market participants commonly assume fully collateralized swaps are risk-free. 
We also study the value of CDS contracts with trilateral credit risk and assess how spreads 
depend on the risk of the buyer, seller, and reference entity in a CDS contract. In general, a CDS contract 
is used to transfer the credit risk of a reference entity from one party to another. The risk circularity that 
transfers one type of risk (reference credit risk) into another (counterparty credit risk) within the CDS 
market is a concern for financial stability. Some people claim that the CDS market has increased financial 
contagion or even propose an outright ban on these instruments. 
The standard CDS pricing model in the market assumes that there is no counterparty risk. 
Although this oversimplified model may be accepted in normal market conditions, its reliability in times 
of distress has recently been questioned. In fact, counterparty risk has become one of the most dangerous 
threats to the CDS market. For some time now it has been realized that, in order to value a CDS properly, 
counterparty effects have to be taken into account (see ECB (2009)). 
We bring the concept of comvariance into the area of credit risk modeling to capture the 
statistical relationship among three or more random variables. Comvariance was first introduced to 
economics by Deardorff (1982), who used this measurement to correlate three factors in international 
trading. Furthermore, we define a new statistics, comrelation, as a scaled version of comvariance. 
Accounting for default correlations and comrelations becomes important in determining CDS premia, 
especially during the credit crisis. Our analysis shows that the effect of default dependencies on CDS 
premia from large to small is i) the default correlation between the protection seller and the reference 
entity, ii) the default comrelation, iii) the default correlation between the protection buyer and the 
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reference entity, and iv) the default correlation between the protection buyer and the protection seller. In 
particular, we find that the default comvariance/comrelation has substantial effects on the asset pricing 
and risk management, which have never been documented. 
There is a significant increase in the use of collateral for CDS after the recent financial crises. 
Many people believe that, if a CDS is fully collateralized, there is no risk of failure to pay. Collateral 
posting regimes are originally designed and utilized for bilateral risk products, e.g., IRS, but there are 
many reasons to be concerned about the success of collateral posting in offsetting the risk of CDS 
contracts. First, the value of CDS contracts tends to move very suddenly with big jumps, whereas the 
price movement of IRS contracts is far smoother and less volatile than CDS. Second, CDS spreads can 
widen very rapidly. Third, CDS contracts have many more risk factors than IRS contracts. In fact, our 
model shows that full collateralization cannot eliminate counterparty risk completely for a CDS. 
This article also shows that the pricing process of a defaultable instrument normally has a 
backward recursive nature if the payoff can be positive or negative. Accordingly, we propose a backward 
induction approach for risky valuation. In contrast to the popular recursive integral solution (see Duffie 
and Huang (1996)), our backward induction method significantly simplifies the implementation. One can 
make use of the well-established algorithms, such as lattice/tree and regression-based Monte Carlo, to 
price a defaultable instrument. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Pricing bilateral defaultable instruments is 
elaborated on in Section 2; valuing multilateral defaultable instruments is discussed in Section 3; the 
conclusions are presented in Section 4. All proofs and some detailed derivations are contained in the 
appendices. 
 
2 Pricing Financial Instruments Subject to Bilateral Credit Risk 
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We consider a filtered probability space ( , F ,   0ttF , P ) satisfying the usual conditions, 
where   denotes a sample space, F  denotes a  -algebra, P  denotes a probability measure, and 
  0ttF  denotes a filtration. 
In the reduced-form approach, the stopping (or default) time i  of firm i is modeled as a Cox 
arrival process (also known as a doubly stochastic Poisson process) whose first jump occurs at default and 
is defined by, 
 it sii HdsZsht  0 ),(:inf          (1) 
where )(thi  or ),( ti Zth  denotes the stochastic hazard rate or arrival intensity dependent on an exogenous 
common state tZ , and iH  is a unit exponential random variable independent of tZ . 
Dependence between the default times is only introduced by the dependence of the intensity )(thi  
on a common process tZ . Consequently, conditional on the path of tZ , defaults are independent, which is 
the reason why this setup is also often called the conditional independence setup. 
It is well-known that the survival probability from time t to s in this framework is defined by 




 
s
t itii
duuhZtsPstp )(exp),|(:),(       (2a) 
 The default probability for the period (t, s) in this framework is given by 




 
s
t iitii
duuhstpZtsPstq )(exp1),(1),|(:),(           (2b) 
 Three different recovery models exist in the literature. The default payoff is either i) a fraction of 
par (Madan and Unal (1998)), ii) a fraction of an equivalent default-free bond (Jarrow and Turnbull 
(1995)), or iii) a fraction of market value (Duffie and Singleton (1999)). The whole course of the recovery 
proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency act is a complex process that typically involves 
extensive negotiation and litigation. No model can fully capture all aspects of this process so, in practice, 
all models involve trade-offs between different perspectives and views. In general, the choice for a certain 
recovery assumption is based on the legal structure of an instrument to be priced. For example, the 
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recovery of market value (RMV) assumption is well matched to the legal structure of an IRS contract 
where, upon default close-out, valuation will in many circumstances reflect the replacement cost of the 
transaction, whereas the best default recovery assumption for a CDS is that the claim made in the event of 
the reference default equals a fraction of the face value of the underlying bond. 
There is ample evidence that corporate defaults are correlated. The default of a firm’s 
counterparty might affect its own default probability. Thus, default correlation/dependence arises due to 
the counterparty relations.  
Two counterparties are denoted as A and B. The binomial default rule considers only two possible 
states: default or survival. Therefore, the default indicator jY  for party j (j=A, B) follows a Bernoulli 
distribution, which takes value 1 with default probability jq , and value 0 with survival probability jp , 
i.e., jj pYP  }0{  and jj qYP  }1{ . The marginal default distributions can be determined by the 
reduced-form models. The joint distributions of a multivariate Bernoulli variable can be easily obtained 
via the marginal distributions by introducing extra correlations. 
Consider a pair of random variables ( AY , BY ) that has a bivariate Bernoulli distribution. The joint 
probability representations are given by 
ABBABA ppYYPp  )0,0(:00      (3a) 
ABBABA qpYYPp  )1,0(:01      (3b) 
ABBABA pqYYPp  )0,1(:10      (3c) 
ABBABA qqYYPp  )1,1(:11      (3d) 
where  jj qYE )( , jjj qp
2 , and   BBAAABBAABBBAAAB pqpqqYqYE   ))((:  where AB  
denotes the default correlation coefficient, and  AB  denotes the default covariance. 
A critical ingredient of the pricing of a bilateral defaultable instrument is the default settlement 
rules. There are two rules in the market. The one-way payment rule was specified by the early 
International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) master agreement. The non-defaulting party is not 
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obligated to compensate the defaulting party if the remaining market value of the instrument is positive 
for the defaulting party. The two-way payment rule is based on current ISDA documentation. The non-
defaulting party will pay the full market value of the instrument to the defaulting party if the contract has 
positive value to the defaulting party. 
1.1   Risky valuation without collateralization 
Consider a defaultable instrument that promises to pay a TX  from party B to party A at maturity 
date T, and nothing before date T. The payoff TX  may be positive or negative, i.e. the instrument may be 
either an asset or a liability to each party. All calculations are from the perspective of party A. 
We divide the time period (t, T) into n very small time intervals ( t ) and use the approximation 
  yy 1exp  provided that y is very small. The survival and the default probabilities for the period (t, 
tt  ) are given by 
  tthtthtttptp  )(1)(exp),(:)(ˆ     (4a) 
  tthtthtttqtq  )()(exp1),(:)(ˆ     (4b) 
Suppose that the value of the instrument at time tt  is )( ttV   that can be an asset or a 
liability. There are a total of four ( 42 2  ) possible states shown in Table 1. 
The risky value of the instrument at time t is the discounted expectation of all the payoffs and is 
given by 
 

      tt
t
t
FF
F
F
)()(exp)()(1)(1)(exp
)()()()()()()()(1
)()()()()()()()(1)(exp)(
0)(0)(
111001000)(
111001000)(
ttVttgEttVttltltrE
ttVtpttpttpttp
ttVtpttpttpttpttrEtV
AttVBttV
ABAAttV
ABBBttV








    (5a) 
where 
)(1)(1)()( 0)(0)( tltltrtg AttVBttV           (5b) 
      )()()()()()(1)()(1)()(1)( ththttttthtthttl BAABABBBABBBB     (5c) 
      )()()()()()(1)()(1)()(1)( ththttttthtthttl BAABABAABAAAA     (5d) 
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where Y  is an indicator function that is equal to one if Y is true and zero otherwise,  tE F  is the 
expectation conditional on the tF , )(tr  is the risk-free short rate, and i  is the recovery rate. 
 
Table 1. Payoffs of a bilateral risky instrument 
This table shows all possible payoffs at time tt  . In the case of 0)(  ttV , there are a total of four 
cases: i) Both A and B survive with probability 00p .  The instrument value is equal to the market value: 
)( ttV  . ii) A defaults but B survives with probability 10p . The instrument value is a fraction of the 
market value: )()( ttVttB   where B  represents the non-default recovery rate. B =0 represents the 
one-way settlement rule, while B =1 represents the two-way settlement rule. iii) A survives but B 
defaults with probability 01p . The instrument value is a fraction of the market value: )()( ttVttB  , 
where B  represents the default recovery rate. 4) Both A and B default with probability 11p . The 
instrument value is a fraction of the market value: )()( ttVttAB  , where AB  denotes the joint 
recovery rate when both parties A and B default simultaneously. A similar logic applies to the case of 
0)(  ttV . 
State 0,0  BA YY  0,1  BA YY  1,0  BA YY  1,1  BA YY  
Comments A and B survive A defaults, B survives A survives, B defaults A and B default 
Probability 00p  10p  01p  11p  
Payoff if 0)(  ttV  )( ttV   )()( ttVttB   )()( ttVttB   )()( ttVttAB   
Payoff if 0)(  ttV  )( ttV   )()( ttVttA   )()( ttVttA   )()( ttVttAB   
 
 The pricing equation above keeps terms of order t . All higher order terms of t  are omitted. 
Similarly, we have 
  ttttVtttgEttV  F)2()(exp)(        (6) 
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Note that  ttg  )(exp  is ttF  -measurable. By definition, an ttF  -measurable random 
variable is a random variable whose value is known at time tt  . Based on the taking out what is 
known and tower properties of conditional expectation, we have 
        
  ti
tttt
ttVttitgE
ttVtttgEttgEttVttgEtV
F
FFF
)2())(exp
)2()(exp)(exp)()(exp)(
1
0 

 

 (7) 
By recursively deriving from t forward over T where TXTV )(  and taking the limit as t  
approaches zero, we obtain 
 









  tT
T
ttT
XduugEXTtGEtV FF )(exp),()(                      (8) 
We may think of ),( TtG  as the bilateral risk-adjusted discount factor and )(ug  as the bilateral 
risk-adjusted short rate. Equation (8) has a general form that applies in a particular situation where we 
assume that parties A and B have independent default risks, i.e. 0AB  and 0AB . Thus, we have: 
 









  tT
T
ttT
XduugEXTtGEtV FF )(exp),()(                   (9a) 
where  
)(1)(1)()( 0)(0)( ululurug AuVBuV          (9b) 
    )()(1)()(1)( uhuuhuul ABBBB             (9c) 
    )()(1)()(1)( uhuuhuul BAAAA             (9d) 
Equation (9) is the same as equation (2.5’) in Duffie and Huang (1996). 
In theory, a default may happen at any time, i.e., a risky contract is continuously defaultable. This 
Continuous Time Risky Valuation Model is accurate but sometimes complex and expensive. For 
simplicity, people sometimes prefer the Discrete Time Risky Valuation Model that assumes that a default 
may only happen at some discrete times. A natural selection is to assume that a default may occur only on 
the payment dates. Fortunately, the level of accuracy for this discrete approximation is well inside the 
typical bid-ask spread for most applications (see O’Kane and Turnbull (2003)). From now on, we will 
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focus on the discrete setting only, but many of the points we make are equally applicable to the 
continuous setting. 
 If we assume that a default may occur only on the payment date, the risky value of the instrument 
in a discrete-time setting is given by 


    tt
t
t
FF
F
F
TTAXBX
TABAAX
TABBBX
XTtKEXTtkTtkTtDE
XTtpTTtpTTtpTTtp
XTtpTTtpTTtpTTtpTtDEtV
TT
T
T
),(),(1),(1),(
),()(),()(),()(),(1
),()(),()(),()(),(1),()(
00
111001000
111001000








    (10a) 
where 
 )()()(1),(),(),()(
),(),()(),(),()(),(),(),(
TTTTtTtqTtqT
TtqTtpTTtpTtqTTtpTtpTtk
ABBBABABAB
ABBABBABB




        (10b) 
 )()()(1),(),(),()(
),(),()(),(),()(),(),(),(
TTTTtTtqTtqT
TtqTtpTTtpTtqTTtpTtpTtk
ABAAABABAB
BAABAAABA




       (10c) 
where ),( tD denotes the stochastic risk-free discount factor at t for the maturity T given by 



  duurTtD
T
t
)(exp),(      (10d) 
We may think of ),( TtK as the risk-adjusted discount factor, and ),( TtkA  and ),( TtkB  as the 
adjustment factors. Equation (10) tells us that the bilateral risky price of a single-payment instrument can 
be expressed as the present value of the payoff discounted by a risk-adjusted discount factor that has a 
switching-type dependence on the sign of the payoff. 
Equation (10) can be easily extended from one-period to multiple-periods. Suppose that a 
defaultable instrument has m cash flows. Let the m cash flows be represented as 1X ,…, mX  with payment 
dates 1T ,…, mT . Each cash flow may be positive or negative. We have the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: The  risky value of the multiple-payment instrument is given by 
      mi tiij jj XTTKEtV 1 10 1),()( F          (11a) 
where 0Tt   and 
 ),(1),(1),(),( 10))((10))((11 1111    jjATVXjjBTVXjjjj TTkTTkTTDTTK jjjj       (11b) 
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where ),( 1jjA TTk and ),( 1jjB TTk  are defined in Equation (10). 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
From Proposition 1, we can see that the intermediate values are vital to determine the final price. 
For a payment interval, the current risky value has a dependence on the future risky value. Only on the 
final payment date mT , the value of the instrument and the maximum amount of information needed to 
determine the risk-adjusted discount factor are revealed. This type of problem can be best solved by 
working backwards in time, with the later risky value feeding into the earlier ones, so that the process 
builds on itself in a recursive fashion, which is referred to as backward induction. The most popular 
backward induction valuation algorithms are lattice/tree and regression-based Monte Carlo.  
1.2   Risky valuation with collateralization 
Collateralization is the most important and widely used technique in practice to mitigate credit 
risk. The posting of collateral is regulated by the Credit Support Annex (CSA) that specifies a variety of 
terms including the threshold, the independent amount, and the minimum transfer amount (MTA), etc. 
The threshold is the unsecured credit exposure that a party is willing to bear. The minimum transfer 
amount is the smallest amount of collateral that can be transferred. The independent amount plays the 
same role as the initial margin (or haircuts). 
In a typical collateral procedure, a financial instrument is periodically marked-to-market and the 
collateral is adjusted to reflect changes in value. The collateral is called as soon as the mark-to-market 
(MTM) value rises above the given collateral threshold, or more precisely, above the threshold amount 
plus the minimum transfer amount. Thus, the collateral amount posted at time t is given by 


 

otherwise
tHtViftHtV
tC
0
)()()()(
)(         (12) 
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where )(tH is the collateral threshold. In particular, 0)( tH corresponds to full-collateralization2; 0H  
represents partial/under-collateralization; and 0H  is associated with over-collateralization. Full 
collateralization becomes increasingly popular at the transaction level. In this paper, we focus on full 
collateralization only, i.e., )()( tVtC  . 
The main role of collateral should be viewed as an improved recovery in the event of a 
counterparty default. According to Bankruptcy law, if there has been no default, the collateral is returned 
to the collateral giver by the collateral taker. If a default occurs, the collateral taker possesses the 
collateral. In other words, collateral does not affect the survival payment; instead, it takes effect on the 
default payment only. 
For a discrete one-period (t, u) economy, the posted collateral at time t is )()( tVtC  . At time u, 
there are several possible states: i) Both A and B survive. The instrument value is equal to the market 
value )(uV ; ii) Either or both counterparties A and B default. The instrument value is the future value of 
the collateral, i.e., ),(/)()( utDtVuC   where we consider the time value of money only. Since the 
majority of the collateral is cash according to ISDA (2012), it is reasonable to consider the time value of 
money only for collateral assets. The large use of cash means that collateral is both liquid and not subject 
to large fluctuations in value. The value of the collateralized instrument at time t is the discounted 
expectation of all the payoffs and is given by 
  
     )(),(1)(),(),(
)(),()(),()(),()(),(),()(
0000
11100100
tVutpEuVutputDE
uCutpuCutpuCutpuVutputDEtV
tt
t
FF
F


  (13a) 
or 
   tt FF ),(/)(),(),()( 0000 stpEsVstpstDEtV          (13b) 
                                   
2  There are three types of collateralization: Full-collateralization is a process where the posting of 
collateral is equal to the current MTM value. Partial/under-collateralization is a process where the posting 
of collateral is less than the current MTM value. Over-collateralization is a process where the posting of 
collateral is greater than the current MTM value. 
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If we assume that default probabilities are uncorrelated with interest rates and payoffs3, we have 
 tF)(),()( sVstDEtV       (14) 
 Equation (14) is the formula for the risk-free valuation. Thus, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: If a bilateral risky instrument is fully collateralized, the risky value of the instrument is 
equal to the risk-free value, as shown in equation (14). 
 Since an IRS is a typical bilateral risky contract, Proposition 2 squares with the results of 
Johannes and Sundaresan (2007), and is also consistent with the current market practice in which market 
participants commonly assume fully collateralized swaps are risk-free and it is common to build models 
of swap rates assuming that swaps are free of counterparty risk. 
1.3   Numerical results 
To study the impact of bilateral credit risk, we have selected a new 10-year fixed-for-floating IRS 
with a quarterly payment frequency. Two counterparties are denoted as A and B. Counterparty A pays a 
fixed rate and counterparty B pays a floating rate.  All calculations are from the perspective of party A. 
The current (spot) market data are shown in Table 2. At the time the contract is entered into, there 
is no advantage to either party. By definition, a swap rate is a fixed rate that makes the market value of a 
given swap at initiation zero. The risk-free swap rate can be easily calculated as 0.03433. 
Since the payoff of an IRS is determined by interest rates, we need to model the evolution of the 
floating rates. Interest rate models are based on evolving either short rates, instantaneous forward rates, or 
market forward rates (e.g., the LIBOR Market Model (LMM)). Since both short rates and instantaneous 
forward rates are not directly observable in the market, the models based on these rates have difficulties in 
expressing market views and quotes in term of model parameters, and lack agreement with market 
valuation formulas for basic derivatives. On the other hand, the object modeled under the LMM is 
market-observable. It is also consistent with the market standard approach for pricing caps/floors using 
                                   
3 Moody’s Investor’s Service (2000) presents statistics that suggest that the correlations between interest 
rates, default probabilities, and recovery rates are very small and provides a reasonable comfort level for 
the uncorrelated assumption. 
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Black’s formula. They are generally considered to have more desirable theoretical calibration properties 
than short rate or instantaneous forward rate models. Therefore, we choose the LMM lattice proposed by 
Xiao (2011) for pricing the defaultable IRS. We also implement the Hull-White trinomial tree to verify 
the results and ensure robustness of the valuation. This paper, however, only reports the results produced 
by the LMM lattice. 
 
Table 2: Current/spot market data  
This table displays the current (spot) market data used for all calculations in this paper, including the term 
structure of continuously compounded interest rates, the term structure of A-rated breakeven CDS 
spreads, and the curve of at-the-money caplet volatilities. 
Term (days) 31 91 182 365 548 730 1095 1825 2555 3650 5475 
Interest Rate 0.0028 0.0027 0.0029 0.0043 0.0071 0.0102 0.016 0.0249 0.0306 0.0355 0.0405 
Credit Spread 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042 0.0045 0.0049 0.0052 0.0058 0.007 0.0079 0.0091 0.0106 
Caplet Volatility 0.3267 0.331 0.3376 0.3509 0.3641 0.3773 0.308 0.2473 0.2141 0.1678 0.1634 
 
We first assume that i) counterparties A and B have independent default risks; ii) the hazard rates 
are deterministic; and iii) both parties have a constant recovery of 60%. We use the LMM to evolve the 
interest rates and then price the risky IRS according to Proposition 1. The risky swap rates are computed 
and shown in Table 3. 
From Table 3, we derive the following conclusions: First, a fixed-rate payer with lower credit 
quality (higher credit risk) pays a higher fixed rate. Second, a credit spread of about 100 basis points 
translates into a swap spread of about 1.3 basis points. Finally, the credit impact on swap rates is 
approximately linear within the range of normally encountered credit quality. This confirms the findings 
of Duffie and Huang (1996). Intuitively, a risk-free floating-rate payer demands a higher fixed rate if the 
fixed-rate payer has a lower credit score. 
 
Table 3. Impact of the credit quality of the fixed-rate payer on swap rates 
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This table shows the effect of counterparty credit quality on swap rates. Assume 0 ABAB  . The 1st 
data column represents the risk-free results. For the remaining columns, we assume that party B is risk-
free and party A is risky. ‘A+100bps’ represents a ‘100 basis points’ parallel shift in the A-rated CDS 
spreads. The results in the row ‘Difference from Risk-Free’ = risky swap rate – risk free swap rate. 
Party A - A A+100bps A+200bps A+300bps 
Credit Quality 
Party B - - - - - 
Swap Rate 0.03433 0.03445 0.03459 0.03473 0.03485 
Difference from Risk-Free 0 0.012% 0.026% 0.04% 0.052% 
 
We next present some new results. Assume that party A has an ‘A+300bps’ credit quality, i.e., a 
‘300 basis points’ parallel shift in the A-rated credit spreads, and party B has an ‘A’ credit quality. The 
risky swap rate with asymmetric credit qualities is calculated as 0.03436. 
 
Figure 1. Impact of default correlation on swap rates 
The curve in this diagram represents the sensitivity of swap rates to changes in counterparty default 
correlation. Party A has an ‘A+300bps’ credit quality and party B has an ‘A’ credit quality. ‘A+300bps’ 
represents a ‘300 basis points’ parallel shift in the A-rated CDS spreads. 
Impact of Default Correlation
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Assume 5.0AB . The effect of the default correlation AB  on swap rate is shown in Figure 1. 
We can draw the following conclusions from the results: First, the counterparty default correlation and the 
swap rates have a negative relation, i.e., a negative sensitivity of swap rates to changes in counterparty 
default correlation is obtained. Second, the graph suggests an almost linear relationship between the swap 
rates and the default correlation. Finally, the impact of the default correlation is modest (e.g., in the range 
of [-2, 2] basis points). 
Bilateral credit risk modeling is probably the simplest example involving default dependency, but 
it shows several essential features for modeling correlated credit risk, which will help the reader better 
understand the increasingly complex cases in the following section. 
 
2 Pricing Financial Instruments Subject to Multilateral Credit Risk 
The interest in the financial industry for the modeling and pricing of multilateral defaultable 
instruments arises mainly in two respects: in the management of credit risk at a portfolio level and in the 
valuation of credit derivatives. Central to the pricing and risk management of credit derivatives and credit 
risk portfolios is the issue of default relationships.  
Let us discuss the three-party case first. A CDS is a good example of a trilateral defaultable 
instrument where the three parties are counterparties A, B and reference entity C. In a standard CDS 
contract one party purchases credit protection from another party, to cover the loss of the face value of a 
reference entity following a credit event. The protection buyer makes periodic payments to the seller until 
the maturity date or until a credit event occurs. A credit event usually requires a final accrual payment by 
the buyer and a loss protection payment by the protection seller. The protection payment is equal to the 
difference between par and the price of the cheapest to deliver (CTD) asset of the reference entity on the 
face value of the protection. 
A CDS is normally used to transfer the credit risk of a reference entity between two 
counterparties. The contract reduces the credit risk of the reference entity but gives rise to another form of 
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risk: counterparty risk. Since the dealers are highly concentrated within a small group, any of them may 
be too big to fail. The interconnected nature, with dealers being tied to each other through chains of OTC 
derivatives, results in increased contagion risk. Due to its concentration and interconnectedness, the CDS 
market seems to pose a systemic risk to financial market stability. In fact, the CDS is blamed for playing a 
pivotal role in the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the disintegration of AIG.  
For years, a widespread practice in the market has been to mark CDS to market without taking the 
counterparty risk into account. The realization that even the most prestigious investment banks could go 
bankrupt has shattered the foundation of the practice. It is wiser to face frankly the real complexities of 
pricing a CDS than to indulge in simplifications that have proved treacherous. For some time now it has 
been realized that, in order to value a CDS properly, counterparty effects have to be taken into account. 
The default indicator jY  for firm j (j = A or B or C) follows a Bernoulli distribution, which takes 
value 1 with default probability jq , and value 0 with survival probability jp . The joint probability 
representations of a trivariate Bernoulli distribution (see Teugels (1990)) are given by 
ABCBCAACBABCCBACBA ppppppYYYPp   )0,0,0(:000   (15a) 
ABCBCAACBABCCBACBA qppppqYYYPp   )0,0,1(:100   (15b) 
ABCBCAACBABCCBACBA pqppqpYYYPp   )0,1,0(:010   (15c) 
ABCBCAACBABCCBACBA ppqqppYYYPp   )1,0,0(:001   (15d) 
ABCBCAACBABCCBACBA qqppqqYYYPp   )0,1,1(:110   (15e) 
ABCBCAACBABCCBACBA qpqqpqYYYPp   )1,0,1(:101   (15f) 
ABCBCAACBABCCBACBA pqqqqpYYYPp   )1,1,0(:011   (15g) 
ABCBCAACBABCCBACBA qqqqqqYYYPp   )1,1,1(:111   (15h) 
where 
 ))()((: CCBBAAABC qYqYqYE       (15i) 
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Equation (15) tells us that the joint probability distribution of three defaultable parties depends 
not only on the bivariate statistical relationships of all pair-wise combinations (e.g., ij ) but also on the 
trivariate statistical relationship (e.g., ABC ). ABC  was first defined by Deardorff (1982) as comvariance, 
who use it to correlate three random variables that are the value of commodity net imports/exports, factor 
intensity, and factor abundance in international trading. 
We introduce the concept of comvariance into credit risk modeling arena to exploit any statistical 
relationship among multiple random variables. Furthermore, we define a new statistic, comrelation, as a 
scaled version of comvariance (just like correlation is a scaled version of covariance) as follows: 
Definition 1: For three random variables AX , BX , and CX , let A , B , and C  denote the means of 
AX , BX , and CX . The comrelation of AX , BX , and CX  is defined by 
 
3 333
))()((
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CCBBAA
ABC
XEXEXE
XXXE





         (16) 
 According to the Holder inequality, we have 
  3 333))()(())()(( CCBBAACCBBAACCBBAA XEXEXEXXXEXXXE    (17) 
Obviously, the comrelation is in the range of [-1, 1]. Given the comrelation, Equation (15i) can be 
rewritten as 
 
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where jj qYE )(  and )( 22
3
jjjjjj qpqpqYE  ,  j=A, B, or C. 
If we have a series of n measurements of AX , BX , and CX  written as Aix , Bix and Cix  where i = 
1,2,…,n,  the sample comrelation coefficient can be obtained as: 
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 More generally, we define the comrelation in the context of n random variables as 
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Definition 2: For n random variables  1X , 2X ,…, nX , let i  denote the mean of iX  where i=1,..,n. The 
comrelation of 1X , 2X ,…, nX   is defined as 
 
n n
nn
nn
nn
n
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XXXE
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2211
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        (20) 
The correlation is just a specific case of the comrelation where n = 2. Again, the comrelation 
n...12  is in the range of [-1, 1] according to the Holder inequality. 
2.1  Risky valuation without collateralization 
Recovery assumptions are important for pricing credit derivatives. If the reference entity under a 
CDS contract defaults, the best assumption, as pointed out by J. P. Morgan (1999), is that the recovered 
value equals the recovery rate times the face value plus accrued interest4. In other words, the recovery of 
par value assumption is a better fit upon the default of the reference entity, whereas the recovery of 
market value assumption is a more suitable choice in the event of a counterparty default. 
Let valuation date be t. Suppose that a CDS has m scheduled payments. Let each payment be 
represented as ),( 1 iii TTsNX    with payment dates 1T ,…, mT  where i=1,,,,m, ),( 1 ii TT   denotes the 
accrual factor for period ),( 1 ii TT  , N denotes the notional/principal, and s denotes the CDS premium. 
Party A pays the premium/fee to party B if reference entity C does not default. In return, party B agrees to 
pay the protection amount to party A if reference entity C defaults before the maturity. We have the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3: The  value of the multiple-payment CDS is given by 
              mi iiiiij jjmi iij jj TTRTTTTOEXTTOEtV 1 1120 11 10 1 ),(),(),(),()( tt FF              (21a) 
where 0Tt   and 
    ),(1),(1),( 10)(10)(1 1111    jjAXTVjjBXTVjj TTTTTTO jjjj          (21b) 
                                   
4 In the market, there is an average accrual premium assumption, i.e., the average accrued premium is half 
the full premium due to be paid at the end of the premium. 
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where   ),()(1),( 111   jjjCjj TTTNTTR  , 2/),(),( 1 TTsNTT Sjj   , and ),( 1 jji TTsNX  . 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
We may think of ),( TtO  as the risk-adjusted discount factor for the premium and ),( Tt  as the 
risk-adjusted discount factor for the default payment. Proposition 3 says that the pricing process of a 
multiple-payment instrument has a backward nature since there is no way of knowing which risk-adjusted 
discounting rate should be used without knowledge of the future value. Only on the maturity date, the 
value of an instrument and the decision strategy are clear. Therefore, the evaluation must be done in a 
backward fashion, working from the final payment date towards the present. This type of valuation 
process is referred to as backward induction.  
Proposition 3 provides a general form for pricing a CDS. Applying it to a particular situation in 
which we assume that counterparties A and B are default-free, i.e., 1jp ,  0jq , 0kl , and 0ABC , 
where j=A or B and  k, l=A, B, or C, we derive the following corollary. 
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Corollary 1: If counterparties A and B are default-free, the value of the multiple-payment CDS is given by 
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where ),(),(),( 111 iiCiiii TTpTTDTTO   ; ),(),(),( 111 iiCiiii TTqTTDTT   . 
The proof of this corollary becomes straightforward according to Proposition 3 by setting kl =0, 
0AB , 0ABC , 1jp , 0jq , 

 
 10 1),(),(
i
g ggiC TTpTtp , and 

 

1
0 1),(),(
i
g ggi TTDTtD .  
If we further assume that the discount factor and the default probability of the reference entity are 
uncorrelated and the recovery rate C  is constant, we have 
Corollary 2: Assume that i) counterparties A and B are default-free, ii) the discount factor and the default 
probability of the reference entity are uncorrelated; iii) the recovery rate C  is constant; the value of the 
multiple-payment CDS is given by 
       
m
i iiici
m
i iiCiiCiCi TTsNTtpTtPTTNTTqTtpTtPtV 1 11 111 ),(),(),(),(1),(),(),()(        (23) 
where  tii TtDETtP F),(),(   denotes the bond price,  tF),(),( icic TtpETtp  , ),(1),( icic TtpTtq  , 
),(),(),(),( 111 iiiii TtpTtpTTqTtp   . 
This corollary is easily proved according to Corollary 1 by setting      ttt YEXEXYE FFF   
when X and Y are uncorrelated. Corollary 2 is the formula for pricing CDS in the market. 
 Our methodology can be extended to the cases where the number of parties 4n . A generating 
function for the (probability) joint distribution (see details in Teugels (1990)) of n-variate Bernoulli can 
be expressed as 
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where   denotes the Kronecker product;  )()( nkn pp   and  )()( nkn    are vectors containing n2  
components: 
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2.2  Risky valuation with collateralization 
According to the ISDA (2012), almost all CDSs are fully collateralized. Many people believe that 
full collateralization can eliminate counterparty risk completely for CDS.  
Collateral posting regimes are originally designed and utilized for bilateral risk products, e.g., 
IRS, but there are many reasons to be concerned about the success of collateral posting in offsetting the 
risks of CDS contracts. First, the values of CDS contracts tend to move very suddenly with big jumps, 
whereas the price movements of IRS contracts are far smoother and less volatile than CDS prices. 
Second, CDS spreads can widen very rapidly. The amount of collateral that one party is required to 
provide at short notice may, in some cases, be close to the notional amount of the CDS and may therefore 
exceed that party’s short-term liquidity capacity, thereby triggering a liquidity crisis. Third, CDS 
contracts have many more risk factors than IRS contracts.  
We assume that a CDS is fully collateralized, i.e., the posting of collateral is equal to the amount 
of the current MTM value: )()( tVtC  . For a discrete one-period (t, u) economy, there are several 
possible states at time u: i) A, B, and C survive with probability 000p . The instrument value is equal to the 
market value )(uV ; ii) A and B survive, but C defaults with probability 001p . The instrument value is the 
default payment )(uR ; iii) For the remaining cases, either or both counterparties A and B default. The 
instrument value is the future value of the collateral ),(/)( utDtV  (Here we consider the time value of 
money only). The value of the collateralized instrument at time t is the discounted expectation of all the 
payoffs and is given by 
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If we assume that  ),(),(),( ututputp ABBA   and  )(),()(),(),( uRutquVutputD CC   are 
uncorrelated, we have 
),(/),()()( ututtVtV ABABC
F           (26a) 
where  
  tF)(),()(),(),()( uRutquVutputDEtV CCF        (26b) 
  tF),(),(),(),( ututputpEut ABBAAB         (26c) 
    tF)()(),(),(),(),(),(),(),( uRuVutututpututputDEut ABCBCAACBABC      (26d) 
The first term )(tV F  in equation (26) is the counterparty-risk-free value of the CDS and the 
second term is the exposure left over under full collateralization, which can be substantial.  
Proposition 4: If a CDS is fully collateralized, the risky value of the CDS is NOT equal to the 
counterparty-risk-free value, as shown in equation (26). 
Proposition 4 or equation (26) provides a theoretical explanation for the failure of full 
collateralization in the CDS market. It tells us that under full collateralization the risky value is in general 
not equal to the counterparty-risk-free value except in one of the following situations: i) the market value 
is equal to the default payment, i.e., )()( uRuV  ; ii) firms A, B, and C have independent credit risks, i.e., 
ij =0  and 0ABC ; or iii) ABCBCAACB pp   . 
2.3  Numerical results 
Our goal in this subsection is to study the quantitative relationship between the CDS premium 
and the credit qualities of the counterparties and reference entity, including the default correlations and 
comrelation in a CDS contract. 
In our study, we choose a new 5-year CDS with a quarterly payment frequency. Two 
counterparties are denoted as A and B. Counterparty A buys a protection from counterparty B. All 
calculations are from the perspective of party A. By definition, a breakeven CDS spread is a premium that 
makes the market value of a given CDS at inception zero. Assume that the reference entity C has an 
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“A+200bps” credit quality throughout this subsection. The 5-year counterparty-risk-free CDS premium is 
0.027 (equals the 5-year ‘A’ rated CDS spread in Table 2 plus 200 basis points). 
Since the payoffs of a CDS are mainly determined by credit events, we need to characterize the 
evolution of the hazard rates. Here we choose the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) model. The CIR process has 
been widely used in the literature of credit risk and is given by 
tttt dWhdthbadh  )(      (27) 
where a denotes the mean reversion speed, b denotes the long-term mean, and   denotes the volatility. 
 The calibrated parameters are shown in table 4. We assume that interest rates are deterministic 
and select the regression-based Monte-Carlo simulation (see Longstaff and Schwartz (2001)) to perform 
risky valuation.  
 
Table 4: Risk-neutral parameters for CIR model 
This table presents the risk-neutral parameters that are calibrated to the current market shown in Table 2. 
‘A+100bps’ represents a ‘100 basis points’ parallel shift in the A-rated CDS spreads. 
Credit Quality A A+100bps A+200bps A+300bps 
Long-Term Mean a  0.035 0.056 0.077 0.099 
Mean Reverting Speed b 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.36 
Volatility   0.022 0.028 0.039 0.056 
 
We first assume that counterparties A, B, and reference entity C have independent default risks, 
i.e., 0 ABCABBCACAB  , and examine the following cases: i) B is risk-free and A is risky; 
and ii) A is risk-free and B is risky. We simulate the hazard rates using the CIR model and then determine 
the appropriate discount factors according to Proposition 3. Finally we calculate the prices via the 
regression-based Monte-Carlo method. The results are shown in Table 5 and 6. 
 
Table 5: Impact of the credit quality of the protection buyer on CDS premia 
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This table shows how the CDS premium increases as the credit quality of party A decreases. The 1st data 
column represents the counterparty-risk-free results. For the remaining columns, we assume that party B 
is risk-free and party A is risky. ‘A+100bps’ represents a ‘100 basis points’ parallel shift in the A-rated 
CDS spreads. The results in the row ‘Difference from Risk-Free’ = current CDS premium – counterparty-
risk-free CDS premium. 
Party A - A A+100bps A+200bps A+300bps 
Credit Quality 
Party B - - - - - 
CDS premium 0.027 0.02703 0.02708 0.02713 0.02717 
Difference from Risk-Free 0 0.003% 0.008% 0.013% 0.017% 
 
Table 6: Impact of the credit quality of the protection seller on CDS premia 
This table shows the decrease in the CDS premium with the credit quality of party B. The 1st data column 
represents the counterparty-risk-free results. For the remaining columns, we assume that party A is risk-
free and party B is risky. ‘A+100bps’ represents a ‘100 basis points’ parallel shift in the A-rated CDS 
spreads. The results in the row ‘Difference from Risk-Free’ = current CDS premium – counterparty-risk-
free CDS premium. 
Party A - - - - - 
Credit Quality 
Party B - A A+100bps A+200bps A+300bps 
CDS premium 0.027 0.02695 0.02687 0.0268 0.02672 
Difference from Risk-Free 0.00% -0.005% -0.013% -0.020% -0.028% 
 
From table 5 and 6, we find that a credit spread of about 100 basis points maps into a CDS 
premium of about 0.4 basis points for counterparty A and about -0.7 basis points for counterparty B. The 
credit impact on the CDS premia is approximately linear. As would be expected, i) the dealer’s credit 
quality has a larger impact on CDS premia than the investor’s credit quality; ii) the higher the investor’s 
credit risk, the higher the premium that the dealer charges; iii) the higher the dealer’s credit risk, the lower 
the premium that the dealer asks. Without considering default correlations and comrelations, we find that, 
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in general, the impact of counterparty risk on CDS premia is relatively small. This is in line with the 
empirical findings of Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2009). 
Next, we study the sensitivity of CDS premia to changes in the joint credit quality of associated 
parties. Sensitivity analysis is a very popular way in finance to find out how the value and risk of an 
instrument/portfolio changes if risk factors change. One of the simplest and most common approaches 
involves changing one factor at a time to see what effect this produces on the output. We are going to 
examine the impacts of the default correlations AB , AC , BC , and the comrelation ABC  separately. 
Assume that party A has an ‘A+100bps’ credit quality and party B has an ‘A’ credit quality. The 5-year 
risky CDS premium is calculated as 0.02703. 
 
Figure 2: Impact of default correlations and comrelation on CDS premia 
Each curve in this figure illustrates how CDS premium changes as default correlations and comrelation 
move from -1 to 1. For instance, the curve ‘cor_BC’ represents the sensitivity of the CDS premium to 
changes in the correlation BC  when 0 ABCACAB  .  
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Assume AB =0.5. The impact diagrams of the default correlations and comrelation are shown in 
Figure 2. From this graph, we can draw the following conclusions: First, the CDS premium and the 
default correlations/comrelation have a negative relation. Intuitively, a protection seller who is positively 
correlated with the reference entity (a wrong way risk) should charge a lower premium for selling credit 
protection. Next, the impacts of the default correlations and comrelation are approximately linear. Finally, 
the sensitivity slopes of the CDS premium to the default correlations and comrelation are -0.06 to AB ; -
0.09 to AC ; -53 to BC ; and -14 to ABC . Slope measures the rate of change in the premium as a result 
of a change in the default dependence. For instance, a slope of -53 implies that the CDS premium would 
have to decrease by 53 basis points when a default correlation/comrelation changes from 0 to 1.  
As the absolute value of the slope increases, so does the sensitivity. The results illustrate that BC  
has the largest effect on CDS premia. The second biggest one is ABC . The impacts of AB  and AC  are 
very small. In particular, the effect of the comrelation is substantial and has never been studies before. A 
natural intuition to have on CDS is that the party buying default protection should worry about the default 
correlations and comrelation. 
 
3 Conclusion 
This article presents a new valuation framework for pricing financial instruments subject to credit 
risk. In particular, we focus on modeling default relationships. Some well-known risky valuation models 
in the market can be viewed as special cases of this framework, when the default dependencies are 
ignored. 
To capture the default relationships among more than two defaultable entities, we introduce a 
new statistic: comrelation, an analogue to correlation for multiple variables, to exploit any multivariate 
statistical relationship. Our research shows that accounting for default correlations and comrelations 
becomes important, especially under market stress. The existing valuation models in the credit derivatives 
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market, which take into account only pair-wise default correlations, may underestimate credit risk and 
may be inappropriate. 
We study the sensitivity of the price of a defaultable instrument to changes in the joint credit 
quality of the parties. For instance, our analysis shows that the effect of default dependence on CDS 
premia from large to small is the correlation between the protection seller and the reference entity, the 
comrelation, the correlation between the protection buyer and the reference entity, and the correlation 
between the protection buyer and the protection seller. 
The model shows that a fully collateralized swap is risk-free, while a fully collateralized CDS is 
not equivalent to a risk-free one. Therefore, we conclude that collateralization designed to mitigate 
counterparty risk works well for financial instruments subject to bilateral credit risk, but fails for ones 
subject to multilateral credit risk.  
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let 0Tt  . On the first cash flow payment date 1T , let )( 1TV  denote the 
market value of the instrument excluding the current cash flow 1X . According to Equation (10), we have 
  tF)(),()( 1110 TVXTTKEtV           (A1) 
Similarly, we have 
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1
)(),()( 22211 TTVXTTKETV F           (A2) 
 Note that ),( 10 TTK  is 1TF -measurable. According to taking out what is known and tower 
properties of conditional expectation, we have 
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 By recursively deriving from 2T  forward over mT , where mm XTV )( , we have 
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      mi tiij jj XTTKEtV 1 10 1),()( F        (A4) 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let 0Tt  . On the first payment date 1T , let )( 1TV  denote the market 
value of the CDS excluding the current cash flow 1X . There are a total of eight ( 82
3  ) possible states 
shown in Table A1. The risky price is the discounted expectation of the payoffs and is given by 
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Similarly, we have 
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 Note that ),( 10 TTO  is 1TF -measurable. According to taking out what is known and tower 
properties of conditional expectation, we have 
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 By recursively deriving from 2T  forward over mT , where mm XTV )( , we have 
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Table A1. Payoffs of a trilateral risky CDS 
This table shows all possible payoffs at time 1T . In the case of 0)( 11  XTV  where )( 1TV  is the market 
value excluding the current cash flow 1X , there are a total of eight ( 82
3  ) possible states: i) A, B, and C 
survive with probability 000p . The instrument value equals the market value: 11)( XTV  . ii) A defaults, 
but B and C survive with probability 100p . The instrument value is a fraction of the market value: 
 111 )()( XTVTB   where B , B , and AB  are defined in Table 1. iii) A and C survive, but B defaults 
with probability 010p . The instrument value is given by  111 )()( XTVTB  . iv) A and B survive, but C 
defaults with probability 001p . The instrument value is the default payment: ),( 10 TTR . v) A and B default, 
but C survives with probability 110p . The instrument value is given by  111 )()( XTVTAB  . vi) A and C 
default, but B survives with probability 101p . The instrument value is a fraction of the default payment: 
 10 ,)( TTRTB . vii) B and C default, but A survives with probability 011p , The instrument value is given 
by  10 ,)( TTRTB . viii) A, B, and C default with probability 111p . The instrument value is given 
by  10 ,)( TTRTAB . A similar logic applies to the case of 0)( 11  XTV .  
Status Probability Payoff if 0)( 11  XTV  Payoff if 0)( 11  XTV  
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0,0,0  CBA YYY  000p  11)( XTV   11)( XTV   
0,0,1  CBA YYY  100p   111 )()( XTVTB    111 )()( XTVTA   
0,1,0  CBA YYY  010p   111 )()( XTVTB    111 )()( XTVTA   
1,0,0  CBA YYY  001p  ),( 10 TTR  ),( 10 TTR  
0,1,1  CBA YYY  110p   111 )()( XTVTAB    111 )()( XTVTAB   
1,0,1  CBA YYY  101p   10 ,)( TTRTB   10 ,)( TTRTB  
1,1,0  CBA YYY  011p   10 ,)( TTRTB   10 ,)( TTRTB  
1,1,1  CBA YYY  111p   10 ,)( TTRTAB   10 ,)( TTRTAB  
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